The ifs and buts of Thailand’s new friendship with Russia

The western democracies are still trying to fathom why Pheu Thai party premier Srettha Thavisin had his photo publicly taken with president Putin at the recent belt and road summit in China whilst inviting the Russian leader for a state visit. Critical social media suggest it was a bad idea because Srettha’s international claim to represent democracy and human rights has hit the proverbial iceberg. Not to mention the negative effects on tourism from traditional markets in America, Europe and Australia. On the other hand, international tourist numbers to Thailand has seldom been affected by the domestic situation for more than a few weeks, even post-coup.

Examined from a Thai perspective, the issues look different. Thailand has had diplomatic relations with Russia for 125 years and the celebrations last year did not attraction any adverse international comment. Indeed, the last czar Nicholas II is commonly credited with helping to save Thailand from imperialist aggression by foreign powers. In 1996, Russia became a fully-fledged “dialogue partner” with the 10-nation ASEAN group, in which Thailand has the second biggest economy, and in 2004 Russia acceded to the treaty of amity and cooperation in southeast Asia.

Russia was silent when the Thai coup if 2014 occurred and, under the leadership of general Prayut Chan-o-cha warm relationships continued. In 2017, both nations drew up a statement of reciprocity which gave Russians and Thais 30 days of visa free travel when travelling to each other’s country (now to be extended to 90 days on a trial basis). As regards Ukraine, Thailand initially voted at the United Nations in March 2022 to condemn Russian aggression, but has abstained from later votes condemning the annexation of the occupied territories. Nor is Thailand a formal state signatory of the international criminal court’s attempt to have Putin arrested if he steps abroad. All these developments occurred well before Srettha became the Thai premier.

Putin has also accepted a state visit invitation from Vietnam. In this context, it’s worth remembering that Joe Biden’s trip to Hanoi in 2023 saw an upgrading of ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership between the US and Vietnam. Vietnam’s policy has to be seen in context, namely to avoid being too committed to one side or the other. Similarly, Srettha will visit San Francisco in the United States in November 2023 to attend the summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. As political analyst Thitinan Pondsudhirak has written, “Srettha has not turned to Putin at the expense of the west. He wants both.”

Thai-Russian trade is still relatively small at US$10 billion a year. Thailand’s exports to Russia include vehicles, machinery, electronics, vegetables and fruit, whilst imports are mainly oil, fertilizer and steel. Much of the trade now moves through the port of Vladivostok with its offshore banking facilities designed to offset western economic sanctions and the exclusion of Swift from financial transactions involving Russia. Western commentators can hold up their hands in horror about Thailand’s collaboration with the man who has inflicted so much misery on Ukraine and the world. But Thailand is now led by a real estate tycoon who is an accomplished salesman keen to do business worldwide. His bold aim pure and simple is to generate enough national wealth to ensure Pheu Thai wins the next general election in 2027.