In every Thai election since 2001, the party that has won the most seats in the House of Representatives has been run by or linked to Thaksin Shinawatra, who served as Thailand’s prime minister from 2001 to 2006. This trend has held even as Thai politics entered an era of chaos. Thaksin was ousted by a military coup, ending 15 years of constitutional transfers of power; he went into exile. In 2008, a government led by his brother-in-law Somchai Wongsawat was dissolved by the Constitutional Court. Thaksin’s sister Yingluck Shinawatra was overthrown as prime minister in another military coup in 2014.
In every Thai election since 2001, the party that has won the most seats in the House of Representatives has been run by or linked to Thaksin Shinawatra, who served as Thailand’s prime minister from 2001 to 2006. This trend has held even as Thai politics entered an era of chaos. Thaksin was ousted by a military coup, ending 15 years of constitutional transfers of power; he went into exile. In 2008, a government led by his brother-in-law Somchai Wongsawat was dissolved by the Constitutional Court. Thaksin’s sister Yingluck Shinawatra was overthrown as prime minister in another military coup in 2014.
The leaders of the 2014 coup still rule Thailand today, and Thaksin’s 36-year-old daughter, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, hopes to lead the Thaksin-linked Pheu Thai Party to victory in the national election on May 14. Whether Paetongtarn can prevail in a stacked electoral playing field and whether the traditional establishment would accept the result remain open questions. Thailand’s next prime minister will again be selected by the democratically elected 500-seat lower house and the 250-seat Senate, which is appointed directly by the military, a change that followed the latest coup.
On May 14, the Pheu Thai Party hopes to win a large enough landslide—or assemble a large enough coalition—to overcome the challenge posed by the Senate and make Paetongtarn the prime minister. But a too-resounding victory for Pheu Thai will threaten Thailand’s conservative establishment, made up of both military leaders and monarchists, and raise the risk of another coup. (The 2006 and 2014 military coups came after months of anti-government protests by hard-line royalists known as “Yellow Shirts.”) Pheu Thai could avoid a similar scenario by working with a military-linked party. However, this compromise may rankle its own supporters, not to mention the reform-minded young activists who led mass protests in 2020.
Thaksin remains one of Thailand’s most influential political figures. During his time as prime minister, his populist economic policies—such as introducing universal health care and debt relief—reduced poverty and earned him widespread support, especially among the rural poor. But his mass popularity posed a challenge to the monarchy, and he upset the military by limiting defense spending and promoting personal allies through the ranks. Paetongtarn, who has never held public office, has evoked nostalgia for the time before 2014 and for her family name during her campaign. She has embraced similar messages as her father, including a pledge to increase Thailand’s minimum wage.
The Pheu Thai Party was founded to evade legal bans on previous political parties linked to Thaksin. The party won 136 seats in the 2019 Thai elections, the first held after the 2014 coup, but the Palang Pracharath Party—led by junta officials—received a big head start. Because the military appointed the Senate, coup leader Prayuth Chan-ocha easily overcame Pheu Thai’s electoral advantage and was confirmed as prime minister by a vote of 500-244. Although that system remains in place, a schism within the traditional establishment has fueled some hopes that the opposition now has a real chance at the prime minister’s office.
Late last year, Prayuth joined a new party called United Thai Nation, leaving the Palang Pracharath Party in the hands of Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan, another former general. But some analysts are quick to splash cold water on the idea that this could divide the Senate in the opposition’s favor. “I don’t think the Senate would actually split up,” said Titipol Phakdeewanich, dean of the political science faculty at Thailand’s Ubon Ratchathani University. Both Prayuth and Prawit want to “hang on” to power, he said, and “in the end they will just compromise and work together.”
Thailand’s conservative establishment currently reflects an alliance between the military and the country’s powerful monarchy—both of which view the power of a figure like Thaksin and calls for greater democratization as a threat. “Sure, there will be divisions among senators based upon a Prawit-Prayuth schism. But if the option is a pro-Thaksin government, then senators will unite against a Pheu Thai government,” said Paul Chambers, a lecturer at Thailand’s Naresuan University, adding that the 2023 election is a “poll created by, for, and of the monarchy-military alliance.”
If Pheu Thai does ally itself with one of the military-affiliated parties, partnering with Prawit and the Palang Pracharath Party might be more palatable for its supporters than working with the main coup leader. “We can’t rule out that possibility,” Titipol said. “Pheu Thai talks about democracy, but it’s also about political expediency and how to take advantage of the system. They are not really focusing on democratic principles.” Facing a barrage of corruption charges, Thaksin hasn’t set foot in Thailand since 2008. One of Pheu Thai’s main goals is to secure his safe return, Titipol added. The party would likely make concessions to ensure that happens.
However, Pheu Thai faces a potential challenge from its current coalition partner: the progressive Move Forward Party, which is firmly committed to democracy. The party is popular among Thai youth and succeeded the Future Forward Party, which was dissolved in 2020 for financial misconduct—charges that supporters and rights groups say are politically motivated. The Future Forward Party surprised many observers by winning the third-most seats in 2019, its first election. Move Forward leader Pita Limjaroenrat said that this year, the party aims to take the most seats in the lower house, running on a message of “decentralizing the country, demonopolizing the country, and demilitarizing the country.”
Public polling suggests Pheu Thai is still expected to win the election, but the progressive party appears to be a force to be reckoned with. Pita said that Move Forward would work with Pheu Thai but would “definitely not work with the junta’s successor parties.” “We believe that the pro-democracy parties, the current opposition parties, are the best option for the country to form the ruling coalition to lead Thailand through a challenging time,” he said. Depending on its performance, Move Forward could complicate an attempt by Pheu Thai to broker a compromise after the election—or it could be left out in the cold.
Pheu Thai party leadership denies that it has a preexisting plan to cooperate with Prawit’s party, insisting that it expects to win a supermajority of seats and form a government on its own. Should this fail, the party’s deputy leader said Pheu Thai would only work with other pro-democracy parties. (Pheu Thai did not respond to a request for an interview.) But if Pheu Thai took the most seats in the lower house and partnered with Prawit and the Palang Pracharath Party, it’s not out of the question their alliance could capture support in the Senate while diminishing the likelihood of another coup.
Unlike in 2019, a few senators have already pledged to abstain from voting for prime minister or to back the candidate with majority support in the lower house, Ken Lohatepanont, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Michigan, pointed out. “I would still view it as unlikely that the body as a whole would support a Pheu Thai or Move Forward candidate, although it is more conceivable that they would support Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan,” he said, adding that the Senate’s role in selecting the prime minister remains a “temporary provision”—and one that might not see the next election cycle.
One potential kingmaker is the moderate Bhumjaithai Party, which is currently the second-largest party in the conservative ruling coalition. “We can say for sure that whoever wins the elections will need Bhumjaithai to form a government,” a party executive confidently told the Thai public broadcaster last year. Bhumjaithai could also lead a weaker civilian government in alliance with either Prawit or Prayuth, Chambers said. The party presents itself as a middle ground between the establishment and those seeking major reforms: It has opposed changing Thailand’s draconian lèse-majesté laws while embracing social liberalization, such as the nation’s decision to decriminalize marijuana last year.
Given that Thailand has seen two military coups in less than 20 years, it’s no surprise that many observers are considering which election results could lead to another one. Chambers said he thinks a coup would be likely if Pheu Thai secures a landslide election victory, or possible even if it strikes a deal with Prawit. “If by some chance the Election Commission does approve an election result in July which gives Pheu Thai a landslide, then expect a coup in the months thereafter,” he said.
However, Titipol disagreed: “Even if Pheu Thai wins, they would find a way to compromise with the military,” he said, adding that the generals likely wouldn’t have the public backing or support of big business necessary to pull off another coup. After all, another crisis could reverberate across Thailand’s economy and sully its reputation as a stable country for tourism and investment. In 2008, royalist protesters seized control of Bangkok’s main international airport, and two years later the military massacred those protesting against the government formed in the wake of the dissolution of the Thaksin-linked administration.
If Pheu Thai does win this year, all of this could incentivize the party to compromise with the military establishment and hope for more genuine reform after the next election, four years from now. But as with any political concession, that would leave the party at risk of abandoning the values that set it apart from its political opponents in the first place. Move Forward is waiting in the wings to capture any disaffected Pheu Thai supporters unable to stomach such a deal. And if recent history is any guide, Thailand’s military could simply knock the board off the table if it feels threatened by potential reforms, whether in 2023 or 2027.
