Thailand’s election last month was a dramatic rebuke of nine years of military-backed rule, which began with a coup in 2014. The opposition, led by the upstart, youthful, and progressive Move Forward Party, won by a landslide and secured a sweeping mandate for change. The constraints of the military-drafted constitution mean it is still unclear whether Move Forward’s coalition will be permitted to govern. But if it does, it would mark a decisive shift with far-reaching consequences for the role of the military in Thai politics—and for Thai democracy.
Thailand’s election last month was a dramatic rebuke of nine years of military-backed rule, which began with a coup in 2014. The opposition, led by the upstart, youthful, and progressive Move Forward Party, won by a landslide and secured a sweeping mandate for change. The constraints of the military-drafted constitution mean it is still unclear whether Move Forward’s coalition will be permitted to govern. But if it does, it would mark a decisive shift with far-reaching consequences for the role of the military in Thai politics—and for Thai democracy.
Thailand’s election bears heavily on the future of its neighbor Myanmar, which is struggling under a brutal military regime that took power in a coup in February 2021. The takeover prompted nationwide protests and a crackdown that has killed more than 3,600 people. In its wake, a widening civil war has driven 1.5 million people from their homes. The military has only ramped up repression in response to growing armed resistance. On the same day that Thailand voted for change, a massive cyclone hit Myanmar’s coast; the military’s initial response was to block humanitarian relief to those affected.
Despite strong words, the international community has largely failed in its efforts to set Myanmar back on a path toward democracy. Until now, Thailand—which holds significant sway in Myanmar—stood in the way of progress. Thailand is one of the country’s top trading partners, Thai companies maintain significant cross-border investments, and more than 1 million migrants from Myanmar live and work in Thailand. And the current Thai government, led by 2014 coup leader-turned-Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, has acted as a shield and lifeline for Myanmar’s isolated generals, whose authoritarian instincts it shares. It has disregarded the junta’s brutality and undermined efforts to mitigate the conflict.
That could change under a government led by Move Forward, which has a far more progressive foreign-policy vision than Prayut and his allies. That extends to Myanmar: Move Forward has spoken out against the coup, even calling for sanctions against the country’s military; its members and affiliates joined protests after the takeover. More recently, Move Forward officials, including party leader Pita Limjaroenrat, have expressed commitment to shifting Thailand’s policy toward Myanmar and aligning it with the countries standing on the side of democracy. Such a shift—if Move Forward can implement it—could open pathways to a more robust regional response to the crisis and help alleviate suffering for Myanmar’s people.
Given all this, it’s no surprise that Myanmar’s military leadership expressed alarm at Move Forward’s victory. Meanwhile, the acting president of Myanmar’s opposition National Unity Government (NUG) was quick to congratulate the party. The NUG, made up of members of Myanmar’s overthrown civilian government and other pro-democracy forces, has sought diplomatic recognition from governments around the world as it challenges the military, but it has struggled to gain a foothold in Southeast Asia. A new regime in Thailand could remove a major impediment for the NUG, opening up opportunities for dialogue with regional partners and spurring greater coordination among Myanmar’s neighbors.
Although Thailand isn’t the Myanmar junta’s chief enabler, the Thai government has contributed to slowing the international response to the crisis, which has allowed Myanmar’s generals to pursue a ruthless campaign of repression. Bangkok has played a strong role in delaying action by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In April 2021, ASEAN leaders agreed to a Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar that called for an end to violence and “constructive dialogue among all parties.” But the bloc has since been hopelessly divided over what to do in the face of the Myanmar junta’s intransigence. Members such as Malaysia and Indonesia have urged direct consultation with more stakeholders, including the NUG. But the more authoritarian governments in the group, including Thailand’s, have been hesitant to ramp up pressure.
This disagreement has led to paralysis—a common feature of ASEAN—and many NUG supporters have urged the group’s more pragmatic members to focus on bilateral meetings or multilateral engagement outside the bloc’s framework. But those countries have remained wary of overstepping ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making structure. Meanwhile, the Thai government had fewer qualms undermining ASEAN to keep Myanmar’s junta out of the cold. Thailand’s foreign minister recently met with Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, who led Myanmar’s coup and is now chairman of the State Administration Council; and the Thai government hosted separate informal meetings to discuss the crisis with select regional partners—an affront to ASEAN centrality. Although Myanmar’s generals have been excluded from ASEAN meetings since late 2021, Thailand welcomed them at its gatherings.
Thailand’s embrace of the Myanmar junta—and its willingness to subvert ASEAN to protect it—are in part the product of a close relationship between the two country’s militaries. But Thailand’s leadership also seems to think that if it gives Myanmar’s generals enough space, the military will repress its way to stability.
That has not worked out so far: The junta’s actions have only spurred greater resistance as it struggles to project control, even in the country’s heartland. If the opposition takes power in Thailand, that could mean an end to the free pass for Myanmar’s generals and to the loopholes around their exclusion from ASEAN. Although Bangkok’s military-backed government has done all it can to block the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus, Move Forward leader Pita has already pledged to pursue it.
There may be more immediate implications. To start, a Move Forward-led government would promise a new border policy. Thailand shares a 1,500-mile border with Myanmar, which has been plagued by transnational crime and violence since the coup. Some of the fiercest fighting in Myanmar has taken place in villages only miles from the Thai border. Towns on the Thai side have become havens for members of Myanmar’s opposition and others fleeing military violence. Thailand has at times blocked cross-border aid and forcibly returned opposition activists to Myanmar authorities. By contrast, Pita has called for establishing a humanitarian corridor, and a Move Forward-led government would be unlikely to hunt down opposition figures sheltering in Thailand.
Furthermore, Move Forward has much in common with Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces. Thailand’s progressive party represents a direct challenge to the military’s dominance in politics, just as the NUG and the wider civil disobedience movement do in Myanmar. Both countries have seen popular opposition snuffed out by coups and crackdowns. Thai and Myanmar opposition activists also share tactics and solidarity. In 2020, Thailand was rocked by protests sparked by the dissolution of Move Forward’s predecessor party, Future Forward; those demonstrations helped propel the new party to its current level of popularity. The following year, Myanmar’s uprising adopted Thai protesters’ three-fingered salute as a symbol of opposition.
A new Thai government certainly wouldn’t end the crisis in Myanmar, but the potential for change is significant, even symbolically. After all, the opposition landslide in Thailand is keeping hope for democracy in Southeast Asia alive.
But just because Move Forward won the election doesn’t mean it will get to form a government. Much like the charter that governed Myanmar prior to 2021, Thailand’s current constitution reserves significant power for the generals and their allies. The military-appointed Senate holds sway when it comes to selecting a prime minister, enabling it to potentially block a Move Forward premiership.
If Move Forward does form a government, it’s not guaranteed that their preferred Myanmar policy would be implemented. Other domestic problems may take priority. The Thai military would likely resist ceding full control over border affairs to a government directly challenging it. And Thailand still may face the prospect of its own coup or crisis in the coming months, should the military decide that Move Forward’s popularity represents too great a threat. Although such an outcome would be unlikely to result in as much destruction as in Myanmar, it could upend hope for democracy in both countries.
Thailand’s political future remains uncertain, but one thing is clear: The people of Myanmar may have as much riding on the formation of Bangkok’s next government as Thais themselves.
